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Emotional complexity, moral conflict and the 
motivations for dispersal events
From after 100,000 years ago, modern humans moved 
out of Africa spreading faster than had any other human 
species, across deserts, mountain ranges and seas, to the 
furthest limits of the globe. The explanations as to why 
they undertook such journeys, despite the risks and often 
failing to survive, have eluded us. One particular frustra-
tion has been that ethnographic accounts which might 
help us to understand the rapid dispersal of human pop-
ulations in the Late Pleistocene are almost unknown – 
modern hunter-gatherers which might provide an analogy 
are tied to politically defined boundaries with no unoc-
cupied lands into which to move. We suspect that the pro-
cesses driving dispersal exist as yet unrecognised in mod-
ern hunting and gathering populations. 
Freuchen notably recounts a rare documented case of 
dispersal into a new region amongst the Netsilik of the 
Canadian Arctic (Freuchen 1961: 116–118). Might the 
motivations for this founding population setting out into 
a new region provide us with an insight into mechanisms 
of dispersal which have yet to be explored?
Freuchen describes the journey of Uvigsakavsik, with 
two other Netsilik men and their wives and children who 
set out alone into the most inhospitable of unoccupied 
arctic tundra in the early years of the twentieth century. 
They journeyed south from Thule around 500km into 
previously unoccupied land in Melville Bay in the hope of 
surviving there. There was no lack of resources or ecologi-
cal reason for their journey. The motivations instead lay 
in a moral dispute. After being accused of lying, ignored 
by others and with tempers running increasingly high, 
Uvigsakavsik could no longer bear to stay and he and his 
wife left his native group, gathering together his allies, 
two men from different groups in similar positions who 
were both accused of murder, intending to form a new 
colony far away. Remarkably Uvigsakavsik’s ‘outlaw’ col-
ony survived, and they even accumulated a wealth of furs. 
After several years of ‘cooling down time’ and hardship 
Uvigsakavsik and his wife travelled back north, bringing 
with them many furs and reconciling with the original 
group. Moral tensions would erupt once again however, 
as after his wife died Uvigsakavsik returned to his untrust-
worthy ways. He stole two wives from other hunters, as 
well as stealing food and making threats to Sigdlu, the 
husband of one of the women he had taken. Uvigsakavsik 
was widely felt to be an upstart. This time, despite a cli-
mate of raised tempers, he made the mistake of staying. 
Sigdlu, and his ally, Odark, shot and killed Uvigsakavsik 
when the three went out hunting narwhal together. The 
Netsilik to which they belonged were careful to make sure 
that the authorities did not find out about what Freuchen 
terms ‘polar justice’. 
Complex and powerful emotions like desires for jus-
tice, resentment, altruistic punishment, motivations to 
take vengeance, jealousy, pride, forgiveness, a need for 
belonging and commitments to shared ethics drove this 
example of a successful founding colony in previously 
unoccupied lands. Were these emotions also part of the 
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impetus for Late Pleistocene human global expansion? 
Rather than any impetus to discover or remarkable human 
ingenuity might widespread emotional commitments, the 
strong glue of love and loyalty which binds us together 
and structures collaboration in egalitarian societies, and 
their darker side, emotions such as altruistic anger, spite, 
vengeance, hatred, desires to punish explain some of the 
enigmatic elements of human dispersal?
The paradox of collaboration 
Emotional commitments and moral emotions are rarely 
considered as a driving force for behaviours, or for changes 
in behaviours in the Palaeolithic. However human emo-
tions are key to our deep seated abilities to collaborate, 
and moreover have structured and predictable effects on 
long term behaviour. 
The hyper-cooperation which characterises our social 
relationships from those of modern hunter-gatherers to 
those of modern industrialised societies depends not only 
cognitive and cultural sophistication but also on emo-
tional complexity (Gamble et al. 2011; Rand and Nowak 
2013; Burkhart et al. 2014). Complex social or moral emo-
tions have evolved for functional reasons (Frank 1988, 
Fiske 2002). Emotions such as guilt motivate us to make 
amends and re-form alliances, gratitude motivates us to 
maintain bonds despite separation in time and space, 
spite and resentment guard us against exploitation, forc-
ing us to leave exploitative alliances and deterring others 
from exploiting us (Fiske 2002). Social or moral emotions, 
focused on other’s interests and apparently irrational in 
the short term, have predictable long term benefits in 
terms of maintaining strong and effective alliances with 
much give and take, and structure our behaviour towards 
others. 
From an evolutionary perspective our capacity for emo-
tional commitments, the ties that our complex emotions 
support, evolved through clear strategic and economic 
advantages (Frank 1988). Emotional commitments and 
trust solve the economic problem of ensuring others will 
help you when you are vulnerable, even if it is not in their 
immediate interests, by providing guarantees of one’s 
own emotional commitment to do likewise (Frank 1988; 
Nesse 2001). Like a binding contract, our emotions have 
been shown to effectively handcuff us to act in certain 
ways, foregoing the potential benefits of defection (which 
become unthinkable) for a long term gain and a level of 
economic cooperation not seen in other species (Nesse 
2001; Rand and Nowak 2013; Spikins 2015). From hxaro 
partners amongst the Jo’Huansi of the Northwest Kalahari, 
to friends setting up in business emotional commitments 
allow us reap the mutual rewards of alliances with much 
give and take which are strong in crisis. However trust 
is hard won, based on significant investments, as well 
as many judgements of genuine motivations (Gottman 
2011) and moreover is soon lost at the first sign of self-
ish behaviour. Examples include inappropriate presents in 
the Jo’Huansi (for whom too large a gift implies a selfish 
orientation to the benefits of an alliance, Weissner 2002) 
to a lack of remorse or guilt in business colleagues who act 
against the interests of others (Nesse 2001). 
A transition to widespread emotional commitments 
will have been an important threshold in the evolutionary 
history of human relationships and behaviour. However 
Randolph Nesse comments
‘In a world without commitments social exchanges 
arise mainly from helping relatives and trading 
favors. In such a world individuals can reliably be 
expected to act straightforwardly in their own inter-
ests. The advent of commitment changes everything. 
As soon as one individual finds a way to convince 
another that he or she will act other than in simple 
self-interest, social life is transformed. Now individu-
als must consider the possibility that others may ful-
fil promises and threats  .  .  . Reputations become 
important predictors of behavior, and people begin 
spending vast amounts of effort to convince others 
that they will fulfil their promises and threats . . . 
Before you know it commitments lead people to do 
all kinds of things they would rather not do, whether 
this means carrying out spiteful threats or helping 
others who will never be able to reciprocate  .  .  . 
These capacities may help explain the human ten-
dency to emotionally extreme behaviours that often 
seem senseless.’ 
Nesse (2001: 1–2)
Clearly there is a ‘dark side’ to emotional commitments 
and the in depth collaboration they support (Jenson 
2010). Empathetic joy, sympathy, compassion and grati-
tude pleasantly bind us to others, however anger at cheat-
ing, spite, shame, resentment and motivations towards 
vengeance following betrayals repel us. This dark side of 
motivations to punish plays an essential role in sustain-
ing altruism and cooperation, preventing exploitation and 
guarding against free-riders (Boyd et al. 2003; Sigmund 
2007). We are hard wired to seek justice despite personal 
cost, and motivations to police those who cheat or exploit 
others have been so essential to human collaboration 
that we are rewarded by a rush of oxytocin when we do so 
(De Quervain et al 2004; Strobel et al. 2011). The paradox 
of remarkable human collaboration is that it exists and is 
maintained only through its darker side of motivations to 
punish, harm and repel. 
Might this ‘dark side’ of cooperation provide us with 
an explanation for the energy of human dispersals after 
100,000 BP? Archaeological evidence for the characteris-
tics of dispersals after 100,000 BP certainly suggests that 
a new explanation, beyond those provided by traditional 
economic or ecological perspectives, is required. 
Late Pleistocene dispersals – the archaeological 
evidence
There seems to be a distinct contrast between patterns 
of dispersal in humans prior to and post the 100,000 BP 
onwards dispersals of ‘moderns’ out of Africa. 
Archaic humans do little to challenge our traditional 
explanations for the spread of populations. Early species 
of hominin were typically limited in their distribution to 
specific environments, for example Australopithecus spp., 
Spikins: The Geography of Trust and Betrayal Art. 10, page 3 of 12
Paranthropus spp., Homo habilis and Homo rudolfensis 
all appear to have been limited to grasslands and rela-
tively open woodlands in Africa (Derricourt 2005; Bolus 
2015). Homo erectus/ergaster expanded out of Africa into 
Asia by 1.6–1.7 million years ago however this seems to 
have been facilitated by large scale grassland environ-
ments (Finlayson et al. 2011). Homo heidelbergensis cer-
tainly covered ‘new ground’ in Europe but apparently 
at a time of particularly clement environments, helped 
by environmental changes in Sinai alternately attract-
ing archaic humans and providing a transit route new 
areas (Derricourt 2005). Neanderthals did occupy higher 
latitude (and colder) regions of Europe which contrast 
completely to the ‘homeland’ of hominins in Africa, even 
occupying the Altai mountains of Siberia (Prüfer et al. 
2014; Bolus 2015). However, as with other archaic spe-
cies, Neanderthals appear to have made such ‘advances’ by 
slowly adapting to the new ecological opportunities pre-
sented to them and moreover to respect and be deterred 
by environmental and climatic barriers, such as the Straits 
of Gibraltar (Derricourt 2005). 
However after 100,000 BP and in line with movements 
of modern humans out of Africa, we start to see a different 
pattern of dispersal. The characteristics of this population 
spread are distinctive and difficult to explain through tra-
ditional ecological approaches (see Table 1). 
Dispersal, as human populations spread out of Africa, 
is extremely rapid. By around 6,000 BP when they arrived 
at what is known as ‘the Uttermost part of the Earth’ (the 
southernmost tip of south America) human as a species 
had crossed millions of miles, many different continents 
and even made substantial sea crossings (Oppenheimer 
2012). From movements out of Africa after 100,000 years 
ago (Armitage et al. 2011; Boivin et al. 2013) they occu-
pied almost the whole globe (see Figure 1). 
Mobility seems to have not only an extraordinary 
energy but also a rather unique pattern. Movements out 
of regions occur at the same times as significant patterns 
of movement within regions, as documented in genetic 
evidence (Mellars 2006b). However whilst dispersal into 
distant risky and inhospitable areas is relatively rapid, that 
into such new parts of already occupied regions is slow. 
The Zagros – Caucasus region is not occupied until 11,000 
years after its surroundings (Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 
2013) and in the southernmost tip of south America it is 
several thousands of years after the initial migration that 
the upland environments are occupied (Morello et al.. 
2012). It is almost as if people were choosing to tackle far 
flung risky environments in preference to those nearby. 
Most notably unlike in previous species the spread of 
modern human populations fail to respect major biogeo-
graphical barriers. New regions, even if risky, seem to exert 
a certain pull. We see populations moving into extremely 
cold environments such as Last Glacial Maximum northern 
Europe, crossing significant deltas, such as the Indus and 
Ganges deltas, making sea crossings such as to Australia, 
Sulawesi, Maluku and island Melanesia, and crossing 
deserts, tundras and jungle environments. The crossing 
to Sahul and the Bismarck Islands would have involved at 
least ten sea crossings, including over 80–100km of open 
Characteristic Examples References
Extremely rapid 1km per year along the ‘coastal express 
route’ to Australia
0.6–1km per year from the Levant to the 
Atlantic coast
0.6–1km per year across Australia
14,000/2000km across the Americas (less 
than 2000 years to reach southern south 
America)
– Mellars 2006a: 797
– Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 2013: 36
– Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 2013: 39
– Bodner et al. 2012
Associated with substantial 
movements within regions
Such as L2 and L3 lineages within Africa – Mellars 2006b
Distance seems to exert a 
certain pull – Risky distant 
environments occupied 
before similar locations in 
occupied regions
Inland and higher altitude occupied well 
after the coastal zone in Tierra del Fuego
Zagros-Caucasus region occupied 
10,000 years later than surroundings
– Morello et al. 2012
– Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 2013: 36
Into risky and entirely new 
environments
Extreme cold in last glacial maximum Europe
Extreme cold in Siberia
Extensive deltas (Indus, Ganges and Brah-
maputra deltas)
Deserts, tundras and jungles
Lengthy sea crossings
–  last glacial maximum Europe, Housley et al. 1997
–  such as the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra 
deltas, Field et al. 2006
–  substantial sea crossings (such as to Sulawesi, 
Maluku, Gebe and Sahul, and island Melanesia, 
Balme and Morse 2006)
–  deserts, tundras and jungle environments (Bar-
Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 2013)
–  The Red Sea, Sahara, Taurus_Zagros mountains 
and Iranian plateau (Bailey 2010)
‘Saltation’ rather than spread – Gamble 2009
Table 1: Characteristics of modern human dispersal.
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sea without sight of land (Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 
2013). Survival was far from certain, and we know that 
often such new colonies will have failed (Housley et al. 
1997).
Gamble contrasts the pattern of a modern human ‘sal-
tation’ dispersal (involving leaps of new groups, backed 
up by links to existing communities) with a more archaic 
‘rolling out’ dispersal pattern (Gamble 2009). Throughout 
Europe and Asia modern humans seem to have leapt into 
and through archaic populations who seemed to have little 
need or desire to disperse in the same way. Bar-Yosef and 
Belfer-Cohen observe that ‘concerning the world spread 
of humanity... the easiest questions to resolve are those of 
‘when’ and ‘how’ while the most difficult and the most highly 
debated is ‘why’’ (2013: 30). 
Traditional explanations aren’t adequate. Population 
increase might seem the first explanation for population 
spread. However the spread of people across what has 
been termed the ‘coastal express route’ to Sahul, or down 
the Americas, is clearly faster than could be explained by 
pressures of population increase (Mellars 2006a; Stringer 
2007) as is the spread in Australia (O’Connell and Allan 
2012). A lack of archaeological evidence for any dense 
occupation along routes of dispersal also supports the 
suggestion that movements were not motivated by simple 
demographic factors (Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen 2013). 
Ecological conditions may have influenced the success of 
dispersal events. Successful dispersals out of Africa seem 
related to ecological changes (Grove 2015) and certain spe-
cific ecological conditions appear to have favoured disper-
sal (such as mangrove swamps, Erlandson and Braje 2015, 
or the ‘kelp highway’, Erlandson et al. 2007). Moreover 
population retreats and declines can be clearly related 
to environmental downturns (Bradtmöller et al. 2012). 
However ecological changes fail to explain a large scale 
pattern of global dispersal which crosses different eco-
logical zones, major barriers and moves into inhospitable 
settings. Both the direction and the dynamism of dispersal 
is out of place with a purely ecological response. 
More sophisticated technological capacities may have 
had some influence on dispersal. The adoption of long dis-
tance projectiles, and particularly bow and arrow technol-
ogy, would have made any conflicts more dangerous (Shea 
2003; Boehm 2011) with the added use of poisons even pro-
viding a certain anonymity (D’Errico et al. 2012) for exam-
ple. Added to which the use of sea-craft make it possible to 
move in new and more rapid ways along productive coasts 
(Bailey and Milner 2002). However dispersals are rapid 
inland as well as along coasts and moreover technological 
developments occur well after 100,000 BP. New technolo-
gies still fail to explain the motivations at work. Conversely 
strong motivations may have been the prompt for the devel-
opment and use of new technologies which both made it 
easier to punish offenders, and easier to get away. 
We can be quick to attribute global expansion to some 
new elevated cognitive capacity of our own species. Yet 
thinking skills and cognitive complexity cannot explain 
a propensity not seen in other species to take risks in 
saltation style movements into new terrain (which would 
often have been unsuccessful). Human populations can-
not have failed to understand the risks involved in set-
ting out in small craft into unknown and often dangerous 
open water, nor across deltas or mountain ranges. With no 
ecological push factor such journeys hardly reflect what 
might be termed a sensible decision grounded in sophisti-
cated analytical reasoning alone. 
The moral dynamics recorded in modern hunter-gather-
ers provide a potential explanation. 
The potential for dispersion through moral 
disputes in modern hunter-gatherers
Complex social or moral emotions motivate movements 
in entirely new ways, and which extend beyond the ele-
ments of small scale hunter-gatherer mobility involved in 
Figure 1: Dispersal pattern of humans after 100,000 BP.
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‘mapping onto’ changing resources. Young men amongst 
the Baka of Cameroon and Gabon for example travel great 
distances to learn innovative craft skills in the hope of 
proving their worth and being more desirable to women 
(Hewlett 2013). However it is disputes and conflict moti-
vated by moral emotions which provide the most energy 
to movements. Serious moral conflicts in small scale 
hunter-gatherers (without complex hierarchical social 
relationships) may not appear to be a common occurrence 
within the timescales visible to ethnographic study. How-
ever within archaeological timescales the episodic erup-
tion of serious moral disputes, which are often serious and 
heartfelt, motivating mobility and potentially dispersion 
become frequent. 
Small scale hunter-gatherers are in fact so renowned 
for their harmony or conviviality and their collaborative 
ethics that conflicts are rarely a focus of study. Wrangham 
calculates on the basis of Burbank’s twelve year study of 
Arnhem Land aboriginal populations in Australia that 
rates of intragroup aggression in hunter-gatherers are 
of the order of 200–300 times lower than chimpanzees 
(Wrangham et al.. 2006 after Burbank 1992). However the 
maintenance of common harmony and of the collabora-
tive ethics on which their survival depends relies on the 
darker side of collaborative motivations as much as the 
light side, and on the possibility of serious dispute. Group 
members must share a willingness to enter into serious 
and potentially life threatening conflict to preserve col-
laboration should the need arise. If recalcitrant transgres-
sors were not reformed or removed a single cheat, bully 
or exploiter would make the collaboration on which such 
groups depend impossible to sustain. Serious moral dis-
putes thus arise episodically. Boehm comments ‘It seems 
to be a characteristic of forager bands that most of the time 
social life proceeds harmoniously, even though once in a 
while serious problems erupt’ (Boehm 1999: 84). Marshall 
documents four flare ups of serious discord amongst 
the Nae-Nae Jo’Huansi over a period of a year and a half 
amongst two bands of 60–75 people (Marshall 1998: 71) 
for example. These disputes tend to be driven by per-
ceived betrayals of commitments from those to friend-
ships or mates to betrayals of group interests or shared 
principles, and can draw in the whole group, particularly 
with no dominant authority and thus few ways of resolv-
ing such disputes internally (Boehm 2011). Conflicts over 
egalitarian or moral principles are most divisive, most dif-
ficult to resolve and most likely to involve everyone. Far 
from frequent to human experience it is over archaeologi-
cal timescales that such irreconcilable disputes become 
potentially significant.
The politics of ‘simple’ hunter-gatherers are by no means 
simple, and it is complex judgements of emotional com-
mitments or trust which structure hunter-gatherer social 
dynamics. Signs of positive motivations towards others, 
not only through positive behaviour but also emotional 
signs such as pleasure at their gain or remorse if causing 
harm, contribute to a high trust metric, which leads to 
greater support from others, whilst signs of selfish behav-
iour detract from it (Gottman 2011; Spikins 2012). The pay-
offs for being widely trusted are seen over the long term. 
Thus amongst the Martu of Western Australia for exam-
ple those showing greatest spontaneous generosity were 
favoured as a hunting collaborators (Bird and Power 2015) 
whilst amongst the Ache of Paraguay a similar history of 
past generosity lead to greater support when ill or elderly 
(Gurven et al. 2000). Within large scale alliances Weissner 
documents how amongst the Jo’Huansi following a time 
of food shortages due to high winds and destruction of 
the mongongo nuts in /Xai/xai half of the population 
moved in with distant allies, cemented through visit and 
gift giving, who they could trust to support them at their 
cost, and without whom survival would have been impos-
sible (Weissner 2002). Even minor transgressions reduce 
trust and ultimately one’s chances of survival, whilst being 
prepared to punish such transgressions at one’s own risk 
increase one’s trustworthiness. 
Declines in trust can often be reconciled if offenders are 
seen to have been punished, and to feel shame or guilt. 
Cheating or attempts at dominance can thus often be 
solved at an early stage by group sanctions such as ridicule 
or gossip which function to ‘bring down’ someone consid-
ered to be an upstart (see Table 2). Turnbull explains an 
incident amongst the Mbuti of the Ituri Forest of Zaire for 
example in which Cephu placed his hunting nets in front 
of others, unfairly catching more game (Turnbull 1961: 
91–101). Cephu’s ‘cheating’ was so severe a transgression 
that everyone united in publicly ridiculing him. Turnbull 
suspected that Cephu had hoped to move away with his 
own group but after this incident he was left without 
enough allies to make a separate hunting party and was 
forced swallow his pride and express his remorse in grov-
elling apology. 
Sanctions such as ridicule and ostracism reflect a cer-
tain emotional distancing from an offender, and desires to 
punish, with the possibility of future reconciliation. Bird-
David for example describes the case of a woman amongst 
the Nyaka of southern India who was ostracised following 
taking food and refusing to share (Bird-David 1990) and 
the anthropologist Jean Briggs was ostracised for three 
months by the Canadian Inuit for displaying anger (Briggs 
1996). Ostracism is a highly painful experience, itself 
Counter-dominance 
tactic
Number of societies in which 
observed ethnographically
Display of negative public 
opinion
10
Criticism 6
Ridicule 5
Disobedience 7
Deposition (overthrow) 9
Fission 17
Exile 2
Execution 10
Table 2: Counter-dominance tactics – data on 48 small 
scale societies with egalitarian tendencies from Boehm 
1993: 232.
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provoking movements. Moreover the so-called ‘Dobby 
Effect’, our common self-punishment in response to feel-
ings of guilt, and arising from an evolutionary history 
of punishment for transgressions, which might be miti-
gated through remorseful prior self-punishment (Nelissen 
2012), may also come in play. Pre-emptively ostracising 
oneself by moving far away from others may also have 
functioned as a form of reprisal reducing self-punishment. 
Declines in trust can pass a threshold point after which 
there is no going back, and reconciliation, at least in the 
immediate term is impossible. Pre-emptive movements 
to prevent disputes escalating are a common reason for 
shifts in band composition amongst hunter-gatherer 
populations (Lee 1979), to the extent that a social sort-
ing of groups with different perspectives can be identi-
fied (Apicella et al. 2012). The mobility of both males 
and females further ensures that potential conflicts can 
be resolved through mobility (Hill et al. 2011). Shifts of 
composition of bands to accommodate complex changes 
in allegiances and prevent irreconcilable disputes turn-
ing into a crisis might not necessarily provide the more 
extreme impetus to set out to settle unoccupied regions 
which Uvigsakavsik experienced, however they may have 
played a role. Moreover the widespread within region 
mobility that complex moral and political alliances and 
disagreements promotes in turn certainly provide an envi-
ronment in which like-minded allies will be aware of each 
other and new groups can easily be formed.
The continued proximity of a transgressor can provoke 
intense anger and violent responses leading not only to 
enforced exile but also capital punishment of offenders. 
In a cross cultural study of 50 Pleistocene forager type 
societies Boehm records cases of moral conflict lead-
ing to sudden capital punishment for anti-social behav-
iour recorded for 24 of them (see Table 3). Almost all of 
these cases were ‘commitment offences’ i.e. derived from 
a failure to commit to group interests and norms (group 
intimidation, sexual transgression, taboo violation) or to 
personal loyalties (theft, adultery or other betrayal) see 
Table 3 (Boehm 2014; Knauft et al. 1991). Expulsions and 
killings are also recorded for what appear to be relatively 
minor crimes such as being quarrelsome (for example 
amongst the Iliaura of north central Australia, Boehm 
1993, after Spencer and Gillen 1976: 263), bossiness (for 
the Jo’Huansi, Lee 1979), being angry (for the Canadian 
Inuit, Briggs 1996) lying or cheating (for example amongst 
the Mbuti, Turnbull 1961). 
Moral disputes based on perceived betrayals of trust pro-
vide ample motivations to leave a group, and on occasions 
to take allies and find somewhere new, whether to prevent 
the escalation of aggression, to avoid humiliation or the 
pain of ostracism or to get quickly out of harm’s way. 
The effects of moral conflicts on dispersal
Even at a conservative estimate that moral disputes might 
prompt new and distant colonies to be formed every 
25 years, and such founding populations might travelling 
only 250km (half that travelled by Uvigsakavsik) egalitar-
ian dynamics would prompt dispersal at a rate of 1000km 
every century (or 10km per year). More rapid movements 
might be expected if using boats, such as hypothesised 
along the coast of the Americas and into Australia. Thus 
the elevated rate of Late Pleistocene dispersal is easily 
explained through deliberate responses to move away 
through moral conflict. 
A motivation to put some distance or barrier between 
oneself and former friends, lovers or allies also explains why 
the nature of modern human dispersal is one of saltation 
events rather than gradual creep. Barriers such as moun-
tain ranges or sea crossings can even be an attraction to 
movement of human populations under the influence of 
moral conflicts. The region of the Red Sea provides one 
such example. During the last glacial cycle there have 
been several periods when the Bab-El-Mandeb straits were 
crossable even without strong seaworthy boats (Bailey 
2010). Such a topographic feature might thus have pro-
vided precisely the kind of barrier (which remains cross-
able back again when tempers might have calmed) which 
could be particularly attractive to founding populations 
of transgressors and their allies, explaining substantial 
archaeological evidence for movements into the Arabian 
Gulf. From the perspective of founding populations, like 
Type of deviance Specific deviance Societies reporting
Intimidation of group (21 reports) Intimidation by malicious sorcery 11
Repeated murder 5
Action otherwise as tyrant 3
Psychotic aggression 2
Sexual transgression (6 reports) Incest 3
Adultery 2
Premarital sex 1
Taboo violation (5 reports) Endangers group by violating taboo 5
Miscellaneous (4 reports) Betray group to outsiders 2
‘Serious’ or ‘shocking’ transgression 2
Unspecified deviance (7 reports) 7
Table 3: Instances of capital punishment in 50 Pleistocene type foraging societies (after Boehm 2014: 36).
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that led by Uvigsakavsik, the Bab el Mandeb straits might 
be seen as a fortuitous no man’s land. Likewise undertak-
ing a risky sea crossing to Australia becomes more under-
standable if one hopes to deter any heated reprisals. Any 
small group heading out to sea, perhaps in the dead of 
night, could not have been followed by even the most 
ardent of individuals seeking revenge. 
Why did moral disputes become significant 
after 100,000 bp?
Might there have been a critical threshold leading to a wide-
spread dependence on emotional commitments, along 
with their ‘darker side’ motivating dispersals, would explain 
a significant transition occurring after 100,000 years ago?
Some of the key elements of human emotional commit-
ments are likely to be of some antiquity, present perhaps 
in the last common ancestor between humans and other 
apes. Our nearest relatives, chimpanzees, feel empathy 
(an appropriate response to another’s emotion) and even 
compassion (being motivated by suffering to actively help 
others) (de Waal 2008) and moreover occasionally a whole 
chimpanzee group has even been recorded uniting to 
expel overly dominating males (Flack and de Waal 2000; 
Boehm 2011; Whiten and Erdal 2012). This tentative 
capacity to bring down a dominating individual, seems to 
indicate both a capacity for altruism and a sense of unfair-
ness, termed by Flack and de Waal the building blocks of 
morality (Flack and de Waal 2000). 
Chimpanzees can collaborate, however they do so prag-
matically rather than through emotional commitments, 
and moreover competition is the norm within their social 
relationships. There is no good evidence for more com-
plex moral emotions, such as gratitude, revenge or spite in 
chimpanzees (Jenson et al. 2006), and whilst alliances with 
some degree of interdependence exist these are based on 
the returns of favours (Shino and Aureli 2010). Indeed 
with no sense of loyalty chimpanzees drop allies quickly 
should they no longer be useful, such as if losing rank 
or being ill or injured (Gilby et al. 2014), and moreover 
expect no repercussions. Individuals enter conflicts moti-
vated only by personal gain (Watts and Mitani 2001) and 
the ‘punishment’ of an individual by one who has no direct 
personal gain from intervention, is extremely rare (Boehm 
2011; Riedl et al. 2012). The costs of such pragmatism is 
that cooperation (such as in food sharing or hunting) is 
limited. Violence is common (Wrangham et al. 2006) and 
there are many records of lethal within group aggression 
(Kaburu 2013) but the social organisation of chimpanzees 
both within and between groups prevents such violence 
leading to movements. Aggressive attacks are initiated by 
superiors and subordinates pragmatically have no option 
but to be submissive and accept aggression. Furthermore 
only females can occasionally move between groups with-
out being attacked and killed by patrols (Boesch et al. 
2008). Chimpanzee communities thus have a remarkable 
stability in composition even over periods of hundreds or 
thousands of years, as illustrated by genetic studies of Y 
chromosome distinctions (Langergraber 2014). There is 
no evidence for any effective founding populations form-
ing new communities. (see Figure 2A).
There have been few ecological pressures driving chim-
panzees towards greater collaboration. However in more 
risky environments and under selective pressures to find 
new ways to buffer shortfalls and risks, to find food and 
to defend themselves we see the gradual emergence of 
mutual interdependence and emotional commitments in 
hominins (Spikins 2012; 2015; Tomasello and Vaish 2013). 
Widespread emotional investments beyond immediate 
kin, including collaborative breeding and food sharing 
appear to have been the key to allowing early hominins 
not only to survive in difficult and variable environments 
but also to move into a new ecological niche which 
included collaborative hunting and fostered subsequent 
brain expansion (Whiten and Erdal 2012). The significance 
of positive reputations and trust within social dynamics 
appears to emerge around two million years ago (Spikins 
2012) becoming well in evidence by around 450,000 years 
ago as shown in both collaborative hunting and care for 
the vulnerable (Spikins 2015). Increasing pressures on 
social, cultural and in turn emotional complexity appear-
ing to be taking place (Taçon 2006; Gamble et al. 2011). 
In these societies being affiliative rather than competitive 
seems to pay off, at least within the group. 
Tomasello and Vaish argue that a key evolutionary tran-
sition occurs between mutual interdependence within a 
group, and a wider collaborative morality and willingness 
to enforce social norms (Tomosello and Vaish 2013). This 
collaborative morality depends on both evolved emo-
tional complexity as well as socio-cultural context. It may 
be this transition, building on existing group based emo-
tional commitments, that we see occurring after 100,000 
BP (see Figure 2B). Certainly it is after this point that 
we see archaeological evidence for widespread large 
scale alliances in exchanges of non-functional gifts and 
greater mobility in terms of movements of raw materials 
suggesting that a certain shared morality allowed exter-
nal alliances to form (Balme and Morse 2006; D’Errico 
and Stringer 2011). Archaeological evidence after this 
point suggests a pattern of low levels of overall violence, 
interspersed with sporadic outbreaks such as that seen 
in egalitarian hunter-gatherers today, as well as isolated 
occurrences of individual killings similar to those we 
recorded as deriving from sexual jealousies, counter-
dominance tactics and reprisals for betrayed loyalties in 
ethnographically documented contexts (Boehm 2011; 
Roksandic et al. 2006; Spikins 2008). A pattern of difficult 
to resolve (albeit rare) moral conflict followed humans 
moving out of Africa after 100,000 BP might also be indi-
cated by the association between the spread of the L3 
haplotype groups out of Africa and ritualised violence, a 
sign of social measures developed to curb the spread of 
serious disagreements (Moreno 2011). Moreover genetic 
and linguistic evidence supports a pattern of a sequential 
expulsion of small founding populations (Atkinson 2011) 
and several migrations out of Africa (Reyes-Centeno et al. 
2015) which would fit with a pattern of dispersal events 
due to moral disputes. 
The precise factors influencing the post 100,000 year 
transition to collaborative morality may be complex. We 
may be tempted to infer that modern humans as a species, 
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emerging in Africa, were simply more emotionally com-
plex than other species, and that this alone allowed them 
to pass a transition point where widespread egalitarian-
ism based on complex moral emotions and commit-
ments was the norm. This may well have been the case. 
Certainly the social structures of archaic species seem 
to have been notably less fluid. Neanderthals appear to 
have practiced patrilocal residence for example (with only 
females moving between groups, Lalueza-Fox et al. 2011) 
as well as frequent, and presumably pragmatic, inbreed-
ing (with matings often between half-siblings, Prüfer et al. 
2014). However it is equally possible that archaic humans 
were prevented from moving into widespread egalitarian 
dynamics by other factors such a low population den-
sity. Equally such societies may have been emotionally 
complex but in their own way. Neanderthals and other 
archaics may have found other solutions to collaboration 
and have danced to their own tune in emotional terms 
Figure 2: The effect of nature of alliances on dispersal. A) Social relationships prior to widespread emotional commit-
ments and emotional complexity: Weak alliances are often and easily broken. Few if any alliances between groups and 
very limited mobility. B) Social relationships based on widespread emotional commitments and emotional complexity: 
Strong alliances are rarely broken, but result in strong motivations to repel those who have ‘betrayed’ commitments 
when they are. Alliances between groups, and much mobility. Motivations to repel (or create distance from previous 
allies) can prompt the creation of new colonies. 
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(Spikins et al. 2014). More evidence and a better understand-
ing of archaic social dynamics may make the transition to 
societies based on widespread and dynamic moral commit-
ments, along with their darker side, better understood. 
Conclusions
‘Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned, Nor hell a 
fury like a woman scorned’ 
William Congreve (1697) The Mourning Bride (Act III, 
Scene VIII)
Betrayals of trust are strong motivators of behaviour. 
The resultant moral disputes and associated ‘dark side’ of 
collaboration are argued to provide the missing factor to 
understanding Late Pleistocene dispersal. Strong motiva-
tions which form part of egalitarian dynamics can push 
previous allies who appear to have betrayed commitments 
into putting some distance (or barriers) between them-
selves and an origin population and provide an expla-
nation for the enigmatic speed and character of human 
dispersals after 100,000 years ago. Such repulsion events, 
whilst rare within the timescales of ethnographic study, 
become frequent over archaeological timescales. Active 
colonisations, such as a sea crossing to Australia, are dif-
ficult to explain through immediate pragmatic choices, 
but easy to explain through the episodic rise of the strong 
motivations to harm others even at one’s own expense 
which widespread emotional commitments bring. Moral 
conflicts provoke substantial mobility, added to which 
the furious ex ally, mate or whole group with a poisoned 
spear or projectile intent on seeking revenge or justice are 
a strong motivation to get away, and to take almost any 
risk to do so. 
Whilst we view the global dispersal of our species as a 
symbol of our success part of the motivations at the heart 
of such movements more probably reflect a darker, if no 
less strictly collaborative, side to human nature. 
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